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Abstract 
 
Motivated by a recent World Bank report on achieving of Millennium Development Goals 
which shows that poverty has been declining in all regions of the world with the exception of 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), this study puts some empirical structure to theoretical and 
qualitative studies on the reconciliation of the Beijing Model with the Washington Consensus. 
It tests the hypothesis that compared to middle income countries, low income countries would 
achieve more inclusive development by focusing on economic governance as opposed to 
political governance. The empirical evidence is based on interactive and non-interactive fixed 
effects regressions and 49 countries in SSA for the period 2000-2012.  The findings confirm 
the investigated hypothesis.  As the main policy implication, in order to address inclusive 
development challenges in the post-2015 development agenda in SSA, it would benefit low 
income countries in the sub-region to prioritise economic governance.  Other theoretical and 
practical contributions are also discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
 The positioning of this inquiry is motivated by three main contemporary challenges to 
African development, notably, the: (i) heartbreaking trends of extreme poverty in sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA); (ii) growing role of the middle class in development outcomes and gaps in the 
corresponding literature and (iii) debates over the relevance of the two dominant models of 
development in African development policy.  
 First, an April 2015 report by the World Bank on the Millennium Development Goal 
(MDG) extreme poverty target has shown that, with the exception of SSA, poverty has been 
declining in all regions of the world (World Bank, 2015; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2017;  
Tchamyou, 2018). The narrative maintains that 45% of nations in the sub-region were off-
track from achieving the MDG extreme poverty target. This disturbing trend starkly contrasts 
with evidence that during approximately the same interval of increasing extreme poverty, the 
sub-region has been enjoying over two decades of growth resurgence that began in the mid 
1990s (see Fosu, 2015a). The worrisome statistic has motivated a growing stream of literature 
devoted to understanding and solving SSA’s poverty tragedy. Fosu (2015b, 2015c), motivated 
by the need to understand if Africa’s recent growth resurgence is a myth or reality, has edited 
a plethora of studies assessing the role of institutions in Africa’s development. Kuada (2015) 
has recommended a paradigm shift from ‘strong economics’ (or structural adjustment 
policies) to ‘soft economics’ (or human capability development) as means to understanding 
Africa’s poverty tragedy. The narrative of Kuada (2015) on ‘soft economics’ for employment, 
poverty alleviation and inclusive growth in Africa accords with another stream of African 
development literature that has focused on the need to tailor foreign aid policies towards 
alternative channels in order to boost employment, reduce poverty and improve human 
resources (Page & Shimeles, 2015; Page & Söderbom, 2015; Simpasa et al., 2015; Jones & 
Tarp, 2015; Jones et al., 2015; Asongu et al., 2016a). 
 Second, the role of the middle class is paramount in contemporary African 
development because of the benefits it has been associated with, notably: (i) historical 
perspectives that the middle class was essential in the development of Europe and North 
America (Landes, 1998; Adelman & Morris, 1997) and (ii) contemporary positions that the 
middle is essential in mitigating poverty (Easterly, 2001), improving social progress 
(Sridharan, 2004), good institutions (Birdsall, 2007a), innovation and entrepreneurship 
(Banerjee & Duflo, 2009), inclusive development (Birdsall, 2010), institutional reforms 
(Loyza et al., 2012) and promotion of democracy (Kodila-Tedika et al., 2016). More specific 
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contemporary middle class African development literature has focused on four main themes, 
namely, the: measurement of the middle class (Resnick, 2015a, 2015b; Cheeseman, 2015; 
Mattes, 2015; Shimeles & Ncube, 2015; Tschirley et al., 2015; Thurlow et al., 2015); 
relationship between the middle class and economic growth (Tschirley et al., 2015; Handley, 
2015);  nexus between governance and the middle class (Mattes, 2015;  Cheeseman, 2015; 
Resnick, 2015b) and the role of the middle class  in debates between the relevance of the 
Washington Consensus (WC) versus the Beijing Model (BM) in African development 
(Asongu & Ssozi, 2016; Asongu, 2016b).  
 Third, the African middle class has been subject to a recent debate on the relevance of 
the two dominant development models for the continent’s development. This growing stream 
of literature is consistent with the view that a burgeoning middle class is essential for a 
sustainable demand for political governance which is a priority of the WC. It is interesting to 
note that the priority of the BM is economic governance. Hence, the middle class has been 
used to reconcile the relevance of the WC and BM for Africa in the short-run and long-term 
respectively. In essence, the BM is defined as ‘state capitalism, de-emphasised democracy and 
priority in economic rights’ whereas the WC is defined as ‘private capitalism, liberal 
democracy and priority in political rights’ (Asongu, 2016b). The BM has delivered a middle 
class to China within a breathtakingly short spell of time. The middle class reconciles both 
paradigms in the perspective that Asongu and Ssozi (2016) have suggested that the 
Washington (resp. Beijing) model should be pursued as a long- (resp. short-) term 
development goal because only a burgeoning middle class may be required to sustainably 
demand political rights. Unfortunately, this interesting stream of qualitative and theoretical 
literature has not been substantiated with empirical evidence.  
 Noticeably, the above literature leaves space for improvement in the need for an 
empirical insight into the role of the WC and the BM in elucidating SSA’s extreme poverty 
tragedy. The objective of this inquiry is therefore to fill the identified gap by investigating 
whether low income countries of the sub-region would achieve more inclusive human 
development by prioritising economic governance in place of political governance. Hence, the 
testable hypothesis is that, compared to middle income countries, low income countries would 
achieve more inclusive development by focusing on economic governance as opposed to 
political governance.  
 In the light of the above, three contemporary paradigm shifts motivate the inquiry. 
These are, the need:  for a complementary framework that reconciles the two dominant 
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development models (Asongu & Ssozi, 2016); to shift from ‘strong economics’ to ‘soft 
economics’ or human development as means to understanding the poverty tragedy of the 
continent (Kuada, 2015) and for shifts in macroeconomic policy that emphasise the middle 
class instead of outweighted outcomes of economic growth (Birdsall, 2007b).  
 Some stylized facts also motivating the study are briefly discussed. As apparent in 
Figure 1, from 1990, extreme poverty has been decreasing in all regions of the world with the 
exception of SSA. According to Shimeles and Ncube (2015), since 2000, the African 
continent has been experiencing a rise in middle class income. Accordingly, most of the 
countries that have enjoyed considerable growth in the middle class have equally experienced 
substantial growth resurgence during the same period.  
 
Figure 1: Comparative regional poverty levels 
 
 By 2010, the middle class had risen to about 34% of the population on the continent, 
representing approximately 350 million people. In 1980, the middle class population was 126 
million, which accounted for 27% of the population. According to the International 
Comparison Program (ICP), for the year 2005, compared to other regions of the world, the 
middle class of Africa increased twofold.  In 2008, annual consumer spending on the 
continent which is traceable to the middle class for the most part stood at 680 USD billion. 
Assuming Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) with base year 2008, the amount represented about 
25% of the continent’s GDP. 
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The remainder of the study is organised as follows. The data and methodology are 
covered by Section 2. Empirical results, discussion and implications are presented in Section 
3. Section 4 concludes with future directions.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data  
 The study investigates a panel of 49 countries in SSA with data from World 
Development Indicators for the period 2000-2012. The start-year is consistent with a recent 
phase of a rising African middle class (Shimeles & Ncube, 2015), while the end year is due to 
constraints in data availability.  The inclusive development dependent variables is the 
inequality adjusted human development index (IHDI). This is in line with recent African 
inclusive development literature (Asongu et al., 2015).  
In order to increase room for policy implications, nine unbundled and bundled 
governance indicators are used. Accordingly, six governance variables from Kaufmann et al. 
(2010) are bundled into three more governance variables in order to articulate the concept of 
governance, namely: (i) political stability/no violence and “voice and accountability” for 
political governance; (ii) government effectiveness and regulation quality for economic 
governance; and (iii) corruption-control and the rule of law for institutional governance.  
  The classification of income groups is in accordance with the World Bank’s 
categorisation of income levels. These are: high income, $12,276 or more; upper middle 
income, $3,976-$12,275; lower middle income, $1,006-$3,975 and low income, $1,005 or 
less (Asongu, 2014, p. 364). 
Four main control variables are selected, namely: remittances, private domestic credit, 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita growth. The 
selection of these variables is consistent with recent inclusive development literature 
(Mlachila et al., 2017;  Seneviratne & Sun, 2013; Anand et al., 2012; Mishra et al., 2011). In 
line with the underlying literature, positive linkages are expected between the control 
variables and the IHDI.  Accordingly, Mlachila et al. (2017) have established positive 
relationships between inclusive growth and the last-three control variables while remittances 
are also intuitively expected to increase inclusive human development because they are 
destined for consumption purposes for the most part (Ssozi & Asongu, 2016).  
 The definitions and sources of variables are provided in Appendix 1. Appendix 2 
discloses the summary statistics, while Appendix 3 provides the correlation matrix. It is 
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apparent from the summary statistics that the means of variables are comparable and from 
standard deviations or corresponding variations, reasonable estimated nexuses would emerge. 
The objective of Appendix 3 is to control for multicollinearity. The high degrees of 
substitutions that are apparent among governance indicators are tackled by employing 
governance variables in distinct specifications.  
  
 
 
 
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
As apparent in the correlation matrix, the governance indicators are characterised by 
high degrees of substitution. While principal component analysis (PCA) has been used in 
contemporary African development literature for the purpose of limiting concerns of 
multicollinearity and over-parameterisation (Tchamyou, 2017), its application in this study is 
also for conceptual clarification. The PCA is used to clarify the notion of ‘governance’ in 
adopted variables. For instance, while there are “voice and accountability” and political 
stability indicators, there is no political governance variable per se. Given that the previous-
two are constituents of political governance, PCA can be used to bundle the constituent 
indicators into a composite measurement called ‘political governance’.   
The PCA is a statistical strategy that is employed to reduce a set of highly correlated 
indicators into a smaller set of uncorrelated variables called principal components (PCs). 
These PCs constitute a substantial variation of information in the initial dataset. The criterion 
used to retain PCs is from Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002). The authors have recommended 
that only PCs with an eigenvalue that is higher than the mean should be retained.  
 Economic governance which consists of government effectiveness and regulation 
quality represents the capacity of the government to formulate and implement policies that 
deliver public goods. Political governance consisting of political stability and voice and 
accountability is the election and replacement of political leaders. Institutional governance 
that is represented by the rule of law and corruption-control denotes the respect by the state 
and citizens of institutions that govern interactions between them. As shown in Table 1, 
economic governance (Ecogov), has an eigenvalue of 1.878 and represents about 93.90% of 
information in the constituent indicators, notably: government effectiveness and regulation 
quality. In the same vein: political governance (Polgov) and institutional governance (Instgov) 
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respectively have: eigenvalues of 1.671 and 1.861, respectively and variations of 83.50% and 
93.0%, respectively.  The obtained PC-augmented regressors provide robust estimates. For the 
purpose of brevity and lack of space, the interested reader can refer to Asongu and 
Nwachukwu (2016a, 2016b) for insights into the efficiency, consistency and inferential 
validity of PC-augmented regressors.  
 
Table 1: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for Governance (Gov) 
Principal 
Components 
Component Matrix (Loadings) Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
Eigen 
Value 
 VA PS RQ GE RL CC    
          
First PC (Polgov) 0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.835 0.835 1.671 
Second PC -0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.164 1.000 0.328 
          
First PC (Ecogov) --- --- 0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.939 0.939 1.878 
Second PC --- --- -0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.060 1.000 0.121 
          
First PC (Instgov) --- --- --- --- 0.707 0.707 0.930 0.930 1.861 
Second PC --- --- --- --- -0.707 0.707 0.069 1.000 0.138 
          
P.C: Principal Component. VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: 
Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. Polgov (Political Governance): First PC of VA & PS. Ecogov (Economic Governance): First 
PC of RQ & GE. Instgov (Institutional Governance): First PC of RL & CC.  
 
 
2.2.2 Estimation technique  
  
 A fixed effects (FE) empirical strategy is adopted in order to control for the 
unobserved heterogeneity. The corresponding panel FE model is as follows.  
tiitih
h
htitititi WGILILGIHD ,,,
4
1
,3,2,10,    

  , (1) 
where tiIHD ,
 
is the inclusive human development of country i
 
at  period t ;   is a constant;
 
G , Governance (political, economic and institutional) ; IL , income levels;  GIL , interaction 
between Governance (G) and income levels (IL);
 
W  is the vector of control variables  (GDP 
per capita growth, Foreign direct investment, Remittances and Private domestic credit);
 
i
 
is 
the country-specific effect and ti ,  the error term. Given that interactive regressions are 
involved in the specification, the study is consistent with Brambor et al. (2006) in involving 
all constitutive terms into the specifications, unless in cases of perfect multicollinearity.  
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3. Empirical analysis  
3.1 Presentation of results  
 Table 2 presents the FE results. The table is structured in three panels: Panel A for the 
full sample, Panel B for low income countries and Panel C for middle income countries. The 
following findings can be established. (1) For the full sample, only the rule of law increases 
inclusive human development. (2) Economic governance and its constituents (regulation 
quality and government effectiveness), the rule of law and institutional governance, increase 
inclusive human development in low income countries. (3) Only voice and accountability is 
significant in decreasing inclusive development in middle income countries. (4) The 
significant control variables display expected signs. It follows from the findings that the 
investigated hypothesis is confirmed: contrary to middle income countries where the effect of 
economic governance is not significant, in low income countries, economic governance drives 
inclusive human development.  
 
Table 2: Inclusive development and governance (Non interactive regressions) 
          
 
Dependent Variable: Inequality Adjusted Human Development (IHDI) 
 
Panel A: Full Sample  
          
 Political Governance Economic Governance Institutional Governance 
   Political 
Stability  
(PolS) 
Voice & 
Accountability 
(VA)  
Political 
governance  
(Polgov) 
Government 
Effectiveness 
(GE) 
Regulation 
Quality(RQ) 
Economic 
Governance 
(Ecogov) 
Corruption-
Control  
(CC) 
Rule of 
Law (RL) 
Institutional 
Governance 
(Instgov) 
          
Constant  0.404*** 0.406*** 0.405*** 0.414*** 0.412*** 0.403*** 0.404*** 0.424*** 0.404*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PolS -0.001 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.749)         
VA --- 0.003 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.717)        
Polgov --- --- -0.00009 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.985)       
GE --- --- --- 0.015 --- --- --- --- --- 
    (0.171)      
RQ --- --- --- --- -0.011 --- --- --- --- 
     (0.266)     
Ecogov --- --- --- --- --- 0.008 --- --- --- 
      (0.135)    
CC --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.001 --- --- 
       (0.869)   
RL  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.027*** --- 
        (0.008)  
Instgov --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.006 
         (0.194) 
GDPpcg 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Credit  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0..000) 
Remittances  0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 
 (0.569) (0.534) (0.558) (0.573) (0.626) (0.625) (0.622) (0.811) (0.410) 
FDI  0.0006** 0.0006** 0.0006** 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0006** 0.0005** 0.0005** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.027) (0.026) (0.015) (0.037) (0.019) 
          
Adj.  R²(within) 0.227 0.227 0.227 0.233 0.231 0234 0.227 0.247 0.232 
Fisher  15.70*** 15.70*** 15.67*** 16.16*** 15.99*** 16.25*** 15.68*** 17.51*** 16.11*** 
Countries  39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
Observations  310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 
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 Panel B: Low Income Countries 
          
Governance  -0.005 0.008 -0.00009 0.043*** 0.029** 0.024*** 0.001 0.038*** 0.016** 
 (0.424) (0.359) (0.987) (0.003) (0.039) (0.002) (0.882) (0.004) (0.042) 
Adj.  R²(within) 0.300 0.301 0.297 0.334 0.316 0.337 0.298 0.333 0.315 
Fisher  13.93*** 13.99*** 13.75*** 16.26*** 14.98*** 16.52*** 13.75*** 16.24*** 14.94*** 
Countries  24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Observations  191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 
          
          
 Panel C: Middle Income Countries 
          
Governance  0.001 -0.048** -0.013 -0.022 -0.017 -0.012 -0.007 -0.0008 -0.003 
 (0.892) (0.010) (0.205) (0.172) (0.301) (0.151) (0.477) (0.965) (0.584) 
Adj.  R²(within) 0.178 0.232 0.191 0.193 0.186 0.194 0.182 0.177 0.180 
Fisher  4.29*** 5.98*** 4.68*** 4.74*** 4.55*** 4.79*** 4.41*** 4.28*** 4.36*** 
Countries  15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Observations  119 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 
          
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDPpcg: Gross Domestic Product per capita growth rate. FDI: Foreign 
Direct Investment. Control variables used for the regressions in Panel A are included in the regressions of Panels B-C.  
 
3.2 Robustness checks with interactive regressions 
 Table 3 presents robustness checks using interactive regressions. Whereas all 
constitutive terms are included into the specifications (Brambor et al., 2006), the low income 
countries (in Panel A) and middle income countries (in Panel B) are omitted in the estimation 
output because of perfect multicollinearity. Hence, in the absence of unconditional effects 
from income levels, the findings of Table 2 are further assessed based on the marginal effects 
of income levels, instead of net effects. There is increasing (resp. decreasing) marginal effects 
from low (resp. middle) income countries in Panel A (resp. B). With the exceptions of 
political stability, political governance and corruption-control for which marginal effects are 
not significant, there are consistent positive and negative impacts from low income and 
middle income countries respectively. Moreover, the effect of low income in the governance-
‘inclusive development’ nexus is likely to be U-shape while the impact of middle income in 
the governance-‘inclusive development’ relationship is likely to be Kuznets or hump shape. It 
follows from the robustness checks that the investigated hypothesis is also confirmed because 
low income countries induce increasing returns of economic governance to inclusive human 
development while middle income nations induce decreasing returns of economic governance 
to inclusive human development.  
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Table 3: Inclusive development and governance (Interactive regressions) 
          
 
Dependent Variable: Inequality Adjusted Human Development (IHDI) 
          
 Political Governance Economic Governance Institutional Governance 
 Political 
Stability 
(PolS) 
Voice & 
Accountability 
(VA) 
Political 
governance 
(Polgov) 
Government 
Effectiveness 
(GE) 
Regulation 
Quality(RQ) 
Economic 
Governance 
(Ecogov) 
Corruption-
Control  
(CC) 
Rule of 
Law (RL) 
Institutional 
Governance 
(Instgov) 
          
 Panel A: Low Income Countries 
          
Low Income (LI) na na na na na na na na na 
          
Governance  0.004 -0.038** -0.007 -0.023 -0.016 -0.012 -0.005 0.0009 -0.002 
 (0.625) (0.043) (0.505) (0.162) (0.313) (0.146) (0.639) (0.959) (0.769) 
Governance*LI -0.009 0.051** 0.009 0.068*** 0.048** 0.038*** 0.008 0.040* 0.021* 
 (0.443) (0.016) (0.458) (0.002) (0.022) (0.001) (0.615) (0.068) (0.050° 
Adj.  R²(within) 0.229 0.244 0.229 0.259 0.246 0.264 0.228 0.257 0.243 
Fisher  13.16*** 14.31*** 13.13*** 15.46*** 14.43*** 15.87*** 13.07*** 15.28*** 14.22*** 
Countries  39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
Observations  310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 
          
          
 Panel B: Middle Income Countries 
          
Middle  Income (MI) na na na na na na na na na 
          
Governance  -0.004 0.013 0.001 0.044*** 0.032** 0.025*** 0.003 0.041*** 0.019** 
 (0.488) (0.157) (0.739) (0.002) (0.019) (0.001) (0.797) (0.001) (0.020) 
Governance*MI 0.009 -0.051** -0.009 -0.068*** -0.048** -0.038*** -0.008 -0.040* -0.021* 
 (0.433) (0.016) (0.458) (0.002) (0.022) (0.001) (0.615) (0.068) (0.050) 
          
Adj.  R²(within) 0.229 0.244 0.229 0.259 0.246 0.264 0.228 0.257 0.243 
Fisher  13.16*** 14.31*** 13.13*** 15.46*** 14.43*** 15.87*** 13.07*** 15.28*** 14.22*** 
Countries  39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
Observations  310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 
          
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Control variables used for the regressions in Panel A of Table 2 are included 
in the regressions of Panels A-B in Table 3. na: estimates omitted from regression output because of perfect multicollinearity.  
 
3.3 Further discussion and implications 
3.3.1 Investigated hypothesis and nexus with the literature  
The investigated hypothesis has been validated with the outcome of the empirical 
analysis. Accordingly, it has been established that ‘low income’-driven economic governance 
contributes more to inclusive human development compared to the effect of ‘middle income’-
driven economic governance. Therefore, from an economic governance perspective, the 
findings run counter to a strand of the existing literature which maintains that the middle class 
improves governance standards for positive social outcomes (Resnick, 2015a; Easterly, 2001; 
Birdsall, 2007a). The findings from an economic governance standpoint accord with the 
pessimism of Rodrik (2015) who is of the stance that the growing African middle class may 
not play a crucial role in the strengthening of governance structures for inclusive 
development.  
 The findings support the stream of literature sympathetic to the view that some middle 
classes may fail to demand better economic governance for inclusive development because 
they may have interests in specific markets and state resources (Poulton, 2014). Hence, an 
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African middle class can stifle good economic governance exclusively to protect its own 
interest.  
 Recent cases of African low income countries that have influenced economic 
governance in the demand for better inclusive development include: the Burkina Faso protest 
that has led to the popular overthrow of President Blaise Compaoré in 2014; Benin’s Red 
Wednesday in 2013 and Zambia’s Black Friday in 2013.  
 
3.2.2 Theoretical and practical contributions   
 Theoretical and practical contributions can be discussed in three main strands, notably:  
(i) lessons from China for Africa’s extreme poverty tragedy; (ii) evolving role of South-South 
relations and the imperative for multi-polar development strategies and (iii) changing 
narratives in the conception of ‘rights’. These are engaged in the same chronological order 
below.  
 First, the validity of the investigated hypothesis has considerable poverty alleviation 
implications for SSA in the post-2015 development agenda. China has substantially decreased 
its poverty over the past decades. The spectacular degree by which such poverty alleviation 
has been achieved with the Beijing model is an eloquent testimony that the Beijing 
development model holds special lessons for SSA as a short-term development strategy. It 
follows that in the light of the Beijing model, a focus by low income countries in SSA on 
economic governance, instead of political governance as means to inclusive human 
development, would go a great way to alleviating the poverty tragedy of the sub-region. 
Accordingly, the Chinese model is complementary to the Washington model. China’s 
development lesson of putting economic rights before political rights cannot be overlooked by 
SSA because in the aftermath of independence in the 1960s, China and countries in the sub-
region were almost at the same threshold of development. However, while China decided to 
chart her own course of development by prioritising economic governance, SSA took to 
prescriptions of the Washington Consensus that prioritise political governance (Asongu, 
2016). Today, differences in development between China and SSA are self-evident, with the 
former helping the latter on many development fronts. In light of this explanation, it is 
apparent that in order to address the post-2015 African extreme poverty challenges, low 
income countries in SSA will benefit substantially in terms of inclusive human development if 
they prioritise economic governance over political governance in the short term. This 
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recommendation is made within the framework that the Washington Consensus is a long-term 
development model.  
 Second, the short-term focus on the Beijing model clearly aligns with the growing 
South-South relations that are being led by China. The need for multi-polar development 
strategies is crucial for contemporary development because the power architecture with which 
the Washington Consensus was framed has lost legitimacy. In essence, entrenched 
dissatisfaction about the political-priorities of Bretton Woods institutions have resulted in the 
creations of the New Development Bank, Contingency Reserve Fund and Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank that are destined to complement respectively, the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund and Asian Development Bank. In essence, these new financial 
institutions led by China aim to focus on prioritising economic rights in complement to 
Bretton Woods institutions.  
Third, validation of the investigated hypothesis can also be understood in the light of 
conceptions of ‘rights’, namely: the ‘right to vote’ (or political rights) versus the ‘right to 
basic needs’ (economic rights). Political rights (or political governance) have been recently 
established to be more endogenous to economic rights (or economic governance) in Africa 
(Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2014). Hence, economic rights should be short-term priorities while 
political rights should be long-run priorities. Within this framework, low income countries 
should prioritise economic governance over political governance (at least in the short-term). 
When a burgeoning middle class has been attained through inclusive human development, the 
demand for political rights is very likely to be sustainable and effective because members of 
the middle class would no longer be concerned about basic human needs like food and shelter.  
The above inference extends to a setting where African and developed countries are 
compared. For instance, while Libya (which is not sampled in this study) was a middle 
income country prior to Western invasion in 2011, it was a lower income country by Western 
standards. The country prioritised economic governance over political governance. The 
Western intervention from a coalition of countries sympathetic to the Washington Consensus 
was primarily on the premise that the political rights of Libyans were more relevant than their 
economic rights in the development of the nation state. Today, the aftermath of the military 
intervention is self-evident: the citizens of Libya do not have the political rights they sought 
before the overthrow of Gaddafi. In essence, it is difficult to object to the fact that: (i) the 
citizens of Iraq are far worse-off than they were under the regime of Saddam Hussein prior to 
US invasion in 2003 and (ii) Libya today is also far worse-off than it was under Colonel 
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Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. These narratives should not be understood as concurring with the 
governance policies of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi. In fact, what the examples 
aim to articulate is the fact that had the West attenuated her priority for political governance 
with ideals of the Beijing model, Iraq and Libya might not be so worse-off today.  
 
4. Conclusion and further research directions 
 Motivated by a recent World Bank report on achievement of Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) which shows that poverty has been declining in all regions of the world with 
the exception of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the purpose of this study has been to complement 
a recent stream of literature devoted to elucidating SSA’s extreme poverty tragedy. To this 
end, the study put some empirical structure to theoretical and qualitative studies on the 
reconciliation of the Beijing Model with the Washington Consensus. This study has tested the 
hypothesis that compared to middle income countries, low income countries would achieve 
more inclusive development by focusing on economic governance as opposed to political 
governance. The empirical evidence is based on fixed effects regressions and 49 countries in 
SSA for the period 2000-2012. Nine bundled and unbundled governance indicators are used, 
namely: political governance (consisting of voice and accountability, and political stability); 
economic governance (entailing government effectiveness and regulation quality) and 
institutional governance (encompassing corruption-control and the rule of law).  
 The findings have confirmed the investigated hypothesis because in non-interactive 
regressions, contrary to middle income countries where the effect of economic governance is 
not significant, in low income countries, economic governance drives inclusive human 
development. Using interactive regressions, the hypothesis is still confirmed because evidence 
of increasing (resp. decreasing) marginal effects of economic governance is apparent in low 
(resp. middle) income countries. It follows that, the effect of low income in the ‘economic 
governance-‘inclusive development’ nexus is likely to be U-shape while the impact of middle 
income in the ‘economic-governance-‘inclusive development’ relationship is likely to be 
Kuznets or hump shape.  
As a main policy implication, in order to address inclusive development challenges in the 
post-2015 development agenda in SSA, it would benefit low income countries in the sub-
region to prioritise economic governance (or the formulation and implementation of policies 
that deliver public commodities). Other theoretical and practical contributions have been 
discussed. Future studies would enrich the literature by engaging country-specific studies to 
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investigate whether the established linkages withstand further empirical scrutiny within 
country-specific settings.  
 
 
  
Appendices 
Appendix 1: Definitions and sources of variables  
    
Variables  Signs  Definitions  Sources 
    
Inclusive 
development 
IHDI Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index UNDP 
    
 
Political Stability  
 
PolS 
“Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional and violent means, including domestic violence and 
terrorism”. 
 
WDI 
    
 
Voice & 
Accountability  
 
VA 
“Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the extent to which a country’s 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government and to enjoy 
freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free media” 
 
WDI 
    
Political 
Governance  
Polgov First Principal Component of Political Stability and Voice & Accountability. 
The process by which those in authority are  
selected and replaced. 
           
PCA 
    
 
Government 
Effectiveness  
 
 
GE 
“Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the quality of public services, 
the quality and degree of independence from political pressures of the civil 
service, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of governments’ commitments to such policies”. 
 
 
WDI 
    
 
Regulation 
Quality 
 
RQ 
“Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private sector development”. 
 
WDI 
    
Economic 
Governance  
Ecogov “First Principal Component of Government Effectiveness and Regulation 
Quality. The capacity of government to formulate & implement policies, and 
to deliver services”.  
              
PCA 
    
 
Corruption-
Control 
 
 
CC 
“Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand 
forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private 
interests” 
 
WDI 
    
 
 
Rule of Law  
 
 
RL 
“Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, the courts, as well 
as the likelihood of crime and violence” 
 
 
 
WDI 
    
Institutional 
Governance  
Instgov First Principal Component of Rule of Law and Corruption-Control. The 
respect for citizens and the state of institutions  
that govern the interactions among them 
PCA 
    
GDP per capita  GDPpcg GDP per Capita growth rate  
    
Private Credit  Credit Private credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions (% of GDP) WDI 
    
Remittance  Remit  Remittance inflows (% of GDP) WDI 
    
Foreign 
investment 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment net inflows (% of GDP) WDI 
 
    
Middle Income MiddleI Lower and Upper Middle Income Countries ($1,006 or more) Asongu 
(2014, p. 
364) 
   
Low Income  Low I Low Income Countries  ($1,005 or less) 
    
UNDP: United Nations Development Program. WDI: World Development Indicators. GDP: Gross Domestic Product 
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Appendix 2: Summary statistics 
      
 Mean SD Min Max Obs 
Inequality Adj. Human Development  0.721 3.505 0.129 0.768 485 
Political Stability  -0.543 0.956 -3.323 1.192 578 
Voice & Accountability  -0.646 0.737 -2.233 0.990 578 
Political Governance  0.000 1.292 -3.440 2.583 578 
Government Effectiveness  -0.771 0.620 -2.450 0.934 577 
Economic Governance  0.002 1.367 -4.049 3.807 577 
Regulation Quality -0.715 0.644 -2.665 0.983 578 
Corruption-Control -0.642 0.591 -1.924 1.249 579 
Rule of Law  -0.741 0.662 -2.668 1.056 578 
Institutional Governance  0.0002 1.364 -3.588 3.766 578 
GDP per Capita growth  2.198 5.987 -49.761 58.363 608 
Private Domestic Credit 18.551 22.472 0.550 149.78 507 
Remittances  3.977 8.031 0.000 64.100 434 
Net Foreign Direct Investment Inflows 5.332 8.737 -6.043 91.007 603 
Low Income  0.632 0.482 0.000 1.000 637 
Middle Income  0.367 0.482 0.000 1.000 637 
      
SD: Standard deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations. Adj: Adjusted.  
 
Appendix 3: Correlation Matrix (Uniform sample size: 310) 
               
Governance Variables  Control Variables  Dep. Vble  
PolS VA Polgov GE RQ Ecogov CC RL Instgov GDPpcg Credit Remit FDI IHDI  
1.000 0.688 0.923 0.653 0.625 0.674 0.692 0.777 0.763 -0.011 0.279 0.032 -0.018 0.411 PolS 
 1.000 0.914 0.774 0.734 0.779 0.683 0.810 0.775 0.113 0.452 0.042 -0.010 0.361 VA 
  1.000 0.775 0.753 0.789 0.748 0.863 0.837 0.053 0.396 0.041 -0.015 0.421 Polgov 
   1.000 0.877 0.972 0.836 0.897 0.900 0.118 0.543 0.020 -0.152 0.584 GE 
    1.000 0.965 0.799 0.856 0.860 -0.0001 0.532 -0.076 -0.192 0.512 RQ 
 
    1.000 0.845 0.906 0.909 0.064 0.555 -0.036 -0.177 0.568 Ecogov 
      1.000 0.851 0.962 0.053 0.469 -0.196 -0.104 0.519 CC 
       1.000 0.961 0.070 0.471 0.079 -0.084 0.507 RL 
 
       
1.000 0.064 0.489 -0.062 -0.098 0.534 Instgov 
         1.000 0.029 0.026 0.172 0.077 GDPpcg 
          1.000 -0.095 -0.082 0.536 Credit 
           1.000 0.122 -0.043 Remit 
            1.000 -0.026 FDI 
             1.000 IHDI 
               
PolS: Political Stability. VA: Voice & Accountability. Polgov: Political Governance.  GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulation 
Quality. Ecogov: Economic Governance. CC: Corruption-Control. RL: Rule of Law. Instgov: Institutional Governance.  GDPpcg : GDP per 
capita growth rate. Credit: Private domestic credit. Remit: Remittances. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. IHDI: Inequality Adjusted Human 
Development Index. Dep. Vble: Dependent Variable.     
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